Sociology as a Science

More The cutting for sociology as a cognizance * 1. The Case for Sociology as a Science 1. Introduction In this paper, I try to put forward several points in favor of sociology as a intuition. In the course of argument, I will also contend the problems of lever acquit sociology and scope of sociology. 2. What is science? To repartee the movement if sociology is a science or non, first we need to know what is science, some early(a)wise the question does not bump off much sense. Actually current philosophical descrys on the constitution of science atomic number 18 diverse, and largely liberalized from previous views.First, they no hourlong accept hearty criteria of falsification as a scientific method. thither atomic number 18 several ways to formulate falsification, plainly her e I mean something like this scientific theories should make observable predictions and we should discard a theory if we play only one discrepancy betwixt a prediction of the theory and a n observation. Because even physics stick outnot meet such(prenominal) a strong criteria, now philosophers like Lakatos (1970) take hold tolerance to such distress to some extent. An an new(prenominal)(prenominal) new movement in philosophy is the approach on the universal laws.Cartw full (1983) argued that seemingly universal physical laws be not really universal, from logical point of view. This and an another(prenominal)(prenominal) reasons (note1), Cartwright (1983) and Hacking (1983) presented a new view of science in which piecemeal lays, instead of universal laws and theories, play the primaeval role of scientific investigation . Here, models means oversimplified mental pictures of structure. For example, planetary model of atoms is long known as an oversimplification, notwithstanding still it is widely utilize by chemists as a convenient way for appraiseing intimately chemical reactions.Feature Article Sociology TestI do not have rep permite space to give a def inition of science, but these considerations will be enough to help our fantasy on the status of sociology. 3. Is sociology a science? With the analysis of science in the previous section in mind, let us turn to sociology. Early sociologists tried to establish sociology as a science, and their arguments are mainly on the methodological analysis of sociology. Comte take aimed that sociology uses four different diversenesss of methodologies, that is to narrate observation, experiment, comparison and historical research as a special case of comparison (CST pp. 9-90, SCS pp. 42-54). These are the methodology utilise in several other scientific dramaticss, especially in biology. So if his sociology had really followed these methods, it would have been a strong case for sociology as a science. But actually he never did empirical research (CST p. 110), so we cannot take his argument at the face entertain. But his argument influenced on other sociologists, especially Durkheim. For D urkheim, sociology is a look at o f social incidents (CST p. 185). A social fact is a thing that is external to, and coercive of, the actor (ibid. emphasis original). Because they are external, social facts cannot be investigated by introspection (ibid. ). We should use empirical research. A typical use of this methodology is in his analysis of suicide (CST p. 195). Durkheim used statistics on suicide rate to establish his argument that suicide is a social phenomenon. He refused alternative hypotheses because their predictions did not agree with the actual statistical data. This is an admirable attempt of empirical research of night club, but there are several problems.Durkheim applied in any case strict criteria of falsification to rival accounts. espousal of these strict criteria is suicidal for sociology, because it is hard for a sociological theory to make a comminuted prediction, let alone to make a precise and correct prediction (and without this, the falsification cri teria do not work). Another connect problem is in his reject ion of introspection as a sociological method. This restricts the scope of sociology too narrowly, and in fact even Durkheims own study becomes impossible.For example, Durkheims definition of suicide is any case of death momenting directly of indirectly from a positive or negative act of an individual against himself, which he knows must produce this result (ED p. 32). But, without using introspection, how can we decide if he knows the result or not, from external evidence only? I conceptualise that Webers methodology provides an attend to to these problems. His key word in this point is Verstehen, a German word for understanding or interpretation (CST pp. 222 -224, FMW pp. 55-56).According to him, we can understand other peoples motivation with introspection of our own intentions, and this kind of familiarity is demand for sociology. This is exactly what Durkheim denied as a method of sociology, but as we precept above even Durkheim himself used this understanding in his actual work. But, o f course, the problem is if this is permissible as a scientific method. steadfast falsification of a theory is almost impossible by such interpreted facts, because if an interpreted fact runs counter to the theory we can merely change the interpretation.But, as we saw in the last section, such strong falsification is given up by philosophers of science as too strict a criteria. Moreover, the arbitrariness of interpretation is not as great(p) as one might worry. For example, Comtes three stage theory (the distributor point of the theory does not matter here) has no follower today because there is no way we can reasonably interpret the evolution of society as obeying such a law. In this case we can say that Comtes theory was falsified.As far as we have this minimal possibility of falsification, we can admit Verstehen as a scientific method of sociology, thus interpretive sociology as a science. Before we proceed to next section, I would like to make a brief remark on the use of models in sociology. One of the reason people may argue against sociology as a science is the lack of the sociological theory. We have Marxs theory, Durkheims theory, Webers theory and so on, but none of them are shared by all sociologists.This seems to make a strong contrast with other fields of science where scientists agree on the basic theories. But, as we saw in the last section, some philosophers conceive that even in other scientific field what scientists are works on are piecemeal models, not a universal theory. And as f or such models, we can find abundant models shared by many sociologists. Actually, this is what Weber called ideal types (CST pp225-228). Ideal types are constructed through exaggerating some features of real cases. By comparing with ideal types we can find characteristics of each real case.These ideal types are useful conceptual tools for sociology besides in the like sense as the planetary model of atoms is a useful conceptual tool for chemists. So, in this point, the difference between sociology and other scientific fields is not so great as it seems to be. 4. On prize unbosom sociology. To talk or so value indigent sociology, I introduce a bankers bill made by philosophers recently (e. g. Laudan 1984). This is the distinction between epistemic values and non-epistemic values. Epistemic values are think to a special type of question what should we accept as knowledge (or a fact)? Logical consistency, empirical adequacy, simplicity etc. are the criteria to answer such a question, and they ar e called epistemic values. On the other hand, other values are supposed to be used to answer the broader question what should we do? These are non-epistemic values. With this distinction, we will find that the claims of value free sociology made by ea rly sociologists were actually the claims for independence of epistemic values from other values in sociolog y (even though they are not conscious about this distinction). First, let us see the case of Spencer.Spencer distinguished several kind s of emotional biases, and claimed that we should exclude these biases from sociological research (CST pp. 124-125). None of these biases are epistemic value as characterized above. Moreover, the Spencers claim that we should exclude these biases is a value judgment, but this is an epistemic value judgment, and as far as this claim itself is not affected emotional biases, to apply such a value to sociology should be O. K. So Spencers argument agrees with my definition of value free sociology. The same argument applies to Weber.Weber says that takeers should not exploit the circumstances in a call down room to imprint upon the students his ad hominem political views (FMW pp. 146-147), because the task of teacher is to teach his students to recognize facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions (FMW p. 147). Again this is a value judgment, but epistemic one. Apparently sociology (or any other science) cannot be free from all values (because the ideal of value free sociology itself is a value), but at least it can be free from non-epistemic kinds of values, when we decide what is a fact and what is not.I guess even Marx can agree this notion of value free sociology to some extent. Of course in Marxs theory the value judgment and the theory are inseparably related, but his actual arguments show that he distinguished these two things. For example, Marx criticizes Ricardo in Theory of Surplus Value, but the simple reason he criticizes Ricardo is not that Ricardo is capitalist, but that Ricardos conceptual scheme is scant(predicate) because it cannot deal with certain cases (KM pp. 398-409). Thus the criteria for this judgment is pistemic values, not other kinds of value. I think that this way of argument gives Marxs theory its persuasiveness. Of course I admit non-epistemic values and sociology have many interrelationsh ips. For example, the choice of research topic is influenced the sociologists personal values, and sometimes a result of sociological research has immediate prescriptive implications (e. g. Marxs analysis on alienated labor KM pp. 77-87). But still, I think, at the point of accepting something as a fact, we should be free from non-epistemic values. 5. On the scope of sociologyComte thought that sociology is the study of social statics (social structure) and social kinetics (social change) (CST p. 94). Durkheim thought that sociology should deal with social facts. Simmel claimed that everything which was not science of external nature must be science of society (SCS p. 29). Does any of them have the right answer? I dont think that there is anything right or impairment on this topic, but my own preference is Simmels answer quoted here. I think that Comtes and Durkheims answers tried to restrict the quash fie ld of sociology to establish sociology as a nonsymbiotic scientific field .But now no one would doubt sociology is an independent field (even though someone might object that it is not a scientific field). In this situation, such a conscious self restriction of subject matter is nothing but an obstacle to interdisciplinary cooperations with psychology and other neighbor fields. This is why I like Simmels answer. 6. Conclusion According to the liberalized philosophical view on science, there is nothing wrong with admitting Webers Verstehen and ideal types as scientific method, thus admitting sociology using these methods as a science.Recent distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values makes the claim of value free sociology intelligible, and I think it is a reasonable position if taken in the sense I defined. I also briefly talked about the scope of sociology, and argued that we should not be restrictive on the subject matter of sociology. For example, even in physics, the scientists in closely related fields sometimes accept mutually dissonant theories in each field and have no problem. This shows that