Intelligence gathering Essay

The primary objective of intelligence gathering is to deal with future danger, not to punish past crimes. This rings especi eithery true in the land of terrorism. Although you are not seeking to punish past crimes, you shadownot discount their good when attempting to understand the future. Information is endless in terminal figures of quantity. There are no limitations to the resources that tolerate create delectationful and viable training. Perhaps the beat source of information is that which comes from human sources. However, in law enforcement the use of cloak-and-dagger officers and informants is limited.The costs and risks associated with such operations are exponential. Also, many of the terrorist groups and organized dis deal groups are closed societies and are difficult to infiltrate. To invade Iraq without preparing to deploy straight off and instruct properly the forces necessary to establish order, protect the inhabitants rich heathen legacy, and safeguard t he material infrastructure of government and the health system is only to evince concern for real people as distinguished from swindle ideas. (Thomas 2003 4).Nor is determination not to tally at least the civilian Iraki dead and maimed, the collateral damage, as it were, of liberation. Nor is leaving Afghanistan in shambles the cave in to pursue war of choice and opportunity but hardly exigency in the Middle East, Nor is willed amnesia about the fate of the Central American countries where, in the name of democracy during the Reagan years, neo-conservatives championed war rather than fostering agree and leveraging the social change that might have given heart to democratic forms.But all of these acts and omissions are enti blaspheme consistent with distrustful power-sharing compromise with the hard proponents of an unadorned chauvinism. And they are consistent as closely with sentiment that administration realists and neo-conservatives appear to possess jointly, which is indifference to what liberal humanitarians give essential due regard for the opinion of our old democratic assort and due concern for the lives of the peoples we propose to democratize. (Thomas 2004 11).Therefore, much of the information gathered comes from conventional sources such as reports, search warrants, anonymous tips, public domain, and records management systems. This information is used to populate various investigative databases. When investigating crime or developing answers to ongoing patterns, series, or trends, law enforcement personnel often rely upon numerous databases and records management systems. One predictable yet little remarked bit of the outrages committed in America on 9/11 has been an good deal of academic interest in the study of terrorism.The number of US institutes and research centers and think thanks which have now added this subject to their research agendas or, in some cases, have been newly established to specialize in this field has mushroomed. In Britain and other European countries the increase in interest has been more than modest some universities are now beginning to recruit specialists in terrorism studies to teach the subject as part of the curriculum of governmental science or internationalistic relations.Yet passim European academia there is still deep-seated reluctance, if not outright refusal, to recognize that analyze terror as weapon, whether by sub-state groups or regimes, is legitimate and necessary learned activity. Most of the standard British precedent texts on politics and international relations make no reference to the concept of terrorism, or if they do it is only to dismiss it on the grounds that it is simply pejorative term for guerrilla war furthermoste and freedom fighting. Equally remarkable is the neglect of the use of terror by regimes and their security forces.The omission of reference to these phenomena in the introductory texts is all the more startling in view of th e fact that throughout history regimes have been responsible for campaigns of mass terror, of lethality and destructiveness far greater in scale than those waged by sub-state groups. (Mary 2003 25) It takes little imagination to see that the events of September 11 delivered profound shock to Americas reason of its relationship with the out of doors initiation. Commentators inside and outside the United States strove to find words to express their sense of the enormity of the attacks.The attacks were wake-up call for Americans. They constituted the end of American innocence, final flack to Americas privileged position of detachment from the messy and cutthroat conflicts that blighted less favored countries. America had now once and for all entered the real world of international politics, its illusion of invulnerability finally shattered. An of the essence(p) assumption behind these reactions was that Americas stance toward the outside world could and must change as resu lt of these events.American isolationism (in so far as it still existed), its tendency to act unilaterally, indeed its famed exceptionalism itself must inevitably give way to an acknowledgment that the United States was just like any other power. What precise policy implications might flow from such recognition was as yet unclear it was enough that the events of September 11 constituted turning point in American foreign relations. The world, it was express repeatedly, would never be the same again, and neither would America. Simulation exercises of terrorist situations which have occurred can be extremely useful.Lessons can be learnt. Response patterns and negotiating positions have to be viewed in the broader context of government policy-making. Problems shown up by simulation can be examined with view to solution are policy-makers prepared for potential crisis or not? Communications breakdown, working at cross purposes and the impact of vital disorganization are regular diff iculties. Terrorist tactics and strategies change and this can bloodline the capabilities of the authorities to respond effectively. (John 2004 33-36).